Based on three years of ethnographic research, the author examines how laboratory geneticists using next-generation genomic sequencing technologies causally link a patient's genotype and phenotype. At stake is the extent to which this technology breaks with Mendelian single gene-single trait genetic determinism. In spite of an abundance of genetic information that could be used to establish complex multicausal interactions at the molecular level, geneticists actively work to reconcile uncertainties, unknowns, and anomalies to broker monogenic causality. The author develops pragmatist semiotics as a novel analytical strategy to capture collective processes of signification.
Genetic researchers establish disease causality through large epidemiological studies and basic laboratory research on mechanisms of genomic action. Following the logic of translational science, these research endeavors are then expected to inform the work of clinical geneticists diagnosing and treating patients. In spite of this focus on postgenomic multicausality with a larger role for social environments, social scientists and epidemiologists have expressed concern that this heavily subsidized and culturally valued search for genetic causes will invigorate biological reductionism (Duster 1990; Lippman 1991; Nelkin and Lindee 2004) . Whether genetic determinism is resuscitated in clinics, however, depends on how clinical geneticists match a patient's symptoms (phenotype) and sequenced DNA (genotype).
The potential for genetic determinism in clinics has become more realistic with the adoption of next-generation sequencing technologies as diagnostic tests. While sequencing the first human genome took 13 years of international collaboration at a cost of $2.7 billion, the clinical availability of whole exome sequencing allows geneticists to examine the majority of all presumed disease-causing genes with one test in weeks for several thousand dollars. Whether such high throughput methods undermine or reinforce genetic determinism, however, depends on how laboratory geneticists interpret this abundance of data for clinical benefits. The stakes of locating genetic causality are high. Besides the potentially life-changing consequences for patients, genetic testing also stands as an ideological battleground in the nature-nurture debate (Hubbard and Ward 1993) , with some social scientists fearing a molecular renaturalization of disease etiology at the expense of social determinants of health (Link and Phelan 1995; Nelkin and Lindee 2004) .
Based on long-term ethnographic observations, I explore how laboratory geneticists use exome sequencing to match a patient's phenotype and genotype and produce a molecular diagnosis. I show that although these scientists review an abundance of genetic information, the most common outcome is a lack of causal relationships. Causality can only be established convincingly if the sequenced variants correspond to a catalog of published disease-causing variants. Yet, exome sequencing often reveals many more promising genetic causes. Laboratory scientists will prioritize genetic findings to let one causal variant rise to the top and occasionally aim to include genes that fall short of their usual causality criteria. They thus craft a narrow causal narrative where one gene corresponds to one or more traits. Geneticists face the paradoxical situation that even though they have access to information about more genes than ever before, it becomes also more difficult to establish causality due to uncertain, unknown, or anomalous findings.
In order to analyze how doubt about causality gives way to certainty in next-generation sequencing, I introduce a pragmatist semiotic approach. In essence, matching genes with symptoms is a semiotic process because the exome data produce a wealth of signs about a patient that may suggest a molecular etiology. By mapping how the semiotic building blocks of meaning making are manipulated and brought into relationships, we can see how actors locate genomic causality creatively in light of material, regulatory, and institutional constraints.
This article makes two distinct contributions. First, for sociologists interested in the dialectic relationship between nature and nurture, I show the extent of contemporary genetic determinism in clinical settings with nextgeneration sequencing by examining how laboratory scientists make causal claims about genes. The current manifestation of genetic determinism matters not only for patients looking for a diagnosis but also for what it says about the role of biology in disease and how, by default, it leaves a space and function for the nongenetic, including social and environmental factors (Shostak 2013) . Second, engaging interpretive researchers concerned with how macrocultural forces (such as genetic determinism) play out at an interactional level, I introduce pragmatist semiotics as a novel analytical research approach to capture how a community of laboratory geneticists collectively develops consistent yet flexible interpretive habits that are responsive to institutional demands (see also Parmentier 2009; Silverstein 2003) . This kind of semiotic analysis intervenes in broader sociological concerns about the role of creativity in routine professional decision making and the boundaries between nature and culture. In the next two sections, I lay the theoretical foundation for these contributions.
GENETIC DETERMINISM
The bedrock notion that one gene explains one trait is the take-home message in countless high school biology textbooks recounting Gregor Mendel's pea experiments. Geneticists have subsequently shown that Mendel's observations were actually the result of pleiotropy (one gene has multiple effects). The other canonical example of autosomal dominant or recessive blue or brown eye color due to a single gene is also wrong: eye color is a polygenic trait, that is, one in which multiple genes converge in one phenotype (Fairbanks and Rytting 2001) . The historian Evelyn Fox Keller (2000) systematically documented the demise of the "one gene, one trait" principle in late 20th-century research genetics for a growing realization that has decentered genes as the main causal agent of biology and given more weight to fluid, dynamic, and complex ecological cell interactions (see (Lock 2005) . The completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP) revealed, contrary to expectations, a relatively low number of genes-rendering the one-gene-onetrait presumption even more problematic (Melendro-Oliver 2004) . Epidemiologists have shown that for most conditions single genes at best could only explain a small proportion of phenotypic variation, leaving-inadvertentlya robust role for environmental factors (Pescosolido et al. 2008) . Even for American Journal of Sociology Mendelian monogenic-oligogenic (single or few genes) diseases, researchers have found that the presence of multiple alleles and more indirect genetic causation pathways render risk predictions more complex and unreliable and the idea of a strict Mendelian inheritance exceptional (Moore 2013) .
For many molecular scientists the frontier of post-HGP research now rests with dynamic epigenetic, genomic, gene-environment, and multifactorial studies. Geneticists have pursued these multicausal goals through epidemiological studies where they examine the etiology, distribution, and control of disease with disease-specific repositories or large general population biobanks. In addition, laboratory scientists using animal and other experimental models focus on the mechanisms of genetic action to understand the molecular nature of disease. These findings are expected to transfer to the clinic where clinical geneticists diagnose, manage, and treat patients. However, especially in light of the high expectations accompanying the HGP, the epidemiological and laboratory research efforts have resulted in limited clinically utility ( Jablonka and Lamb 2006; Krimsky and Gruber 2013; Landecker and Panofsky 2013; Maheu and MacDonald 2011) . The field of clinical genetics is consequently caught between the increasingly unsatisfactory paradigm of Mendelian genetic determinism and the unfulfilled promise of more sophisticated, multicausal paradigms.
Kuhn predicted that in such transition periods, scientists would maintain the old paradigm unless an alternative could take its place. Indeed, "the current generation of [genetic] scientists, especially when they work in alliance with the corporate world have, for the most part, been trained for and remain firmly embedded in a deterministic framework" (Lock 2011, p. 262) . Genetic determinism may proliferate because of its broader sociocultural resonance (Lemke 2004 ) and the preponderance of literature identifying single rather than more complex influences (Botstein and Risch 2003) . While scientists may "devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict" (Kuhn 1962, p. 78) , frictions going beyond the typical puzzle solving of what Kuhn calls normal science may become apparent. These anomalies may eventually lead to a new paradigm but, Kuhn notes, such a transformation is not inevitable: the old paradigm may be extended or recalcitrant problems may be set aside.
A key site where the ramification of clashing paradigms will be felt is the clinic, where clinical geneticists used to testing chromosomes or single genes for the past decades have recently received the option to diagnose patients using next-generation sequencing technologies such as exome sequencing. Whole exome sequencing constitutes a targeted approach to sequence the coding regions of the human genome to identify disease-causing or pathogenic genes. Exome sequencing gives geneticists access to the 1.2% of the genome involved in an estimated 85% of disease mutations. In publications to clinicians, geneticists emphasize that the promise of whole exome se-quencing in the clinic rests on the identification of diseases following de novo variants-that is, a genetic variant that appears for the first time in a family member-and Mendelian inheritance patterns (Biesecker and Green 2014) . Considering that a single individual will have thousands of variants potentially associated with inherited disease (1000 Genomes Project Consortium 2010), the challenge of interpreting exome findings lies in identifying the specific variants responsible for the patient's phenotype.
While social scientists have extensively studied genetics (Freese and Shostak 2009 ), little attention has been paid to the actual matching of genetic material with patients' symptoms in light of a rapidly shifting genetic research literature, even though each match establishes a potentially farreaching claim for genetic causality. Much social science research has focused on the impact of social environments in gene-environment interactions for a wide range of outcomes relevant to human health and well-being (Boardman et al. 2011; Guo and Stearns 2002; Pescosolido et al. 2008) , the production of causal knowledge in research laboratories (Bumiller 2009; Hedgecoe 2001; Kerr 2000) , and the interpretation of genetic findings in clinics (e.g., Latimer 2007; Stivers and Timmermans 2016) . This last area of research shows that patients and clinicians strategically interpret genetic test results based on a range of disease and patient factors (Condit 2011 ). Yet little is known about the behind-the-scenes practices of laboratory scientists identifying causal genetic relationships that link the bench and epidemiological work with conversations at the bedside.
As intermediaries bridging a large genetic research literature and the sequenced DNA of individual patients, laboratory scientists interpreting exome sequencing results are the critical causality brokers deciding and implementing the criteria that render a gene responsible for a phenotype as well as the strength of causality, the number of causal genes and their relationships, and the role of alternative environmental explanations. These scientists obviously do not conduct the exhaustive basic laboratory research that discovers how DNA expression and regulation cause disease or run the extensive genetic data banks characteristic of genetic epidemiology, but neither do they simply apply what others have published. Although, as will become clear, the published literature greatly constrains genetic causality in diagnostic testing, this literature needs to be adapted to the task at hand of establishing genetic causality in an individual patient. Laboratory geneticists' also use an ordinal scale of causality from uncertain clinical significance to clearly pathogenic. Locating genotype-phenotype matches on this scale requires adjudicating the molecular properties of variants in light of a patient's symptoms with an eye to clinical action. In addition, clinicians may order tests for conditions such as cardiac or neurological disorders that are not associated with Mendelian high penetrance genotypes, and the laboratory geneticists will need to decide how the technology accommodates such com-plex genetic causality. Each of these elements adds a level of ambiguity to the interpretive process, and if geneticists decide that the variant does not meet the bar of causality, it will become indistinguishable from the other presumably benign variants that make up a patient's DNA.
As genomic causality brokers, laboratory geneticists are gatekeepers, deciding which genes are to be regarded as causal in a clinical context. At stake is not simply an individual patient's diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis or the collective implications for the family pedigree and reproductive decision making: each exome sequenced and interpreted also constitutes a sociocultural manifestation of DNA's explanatory power. Laboratory geneticists work within a margin of interpretive flexibility that becomes constitutive of genetic causality because it specifies phenotype-genotype matches. There is room for creativity, although not the traditional creativity of scientific discovery, but the creativity of trying out new causal relationships within the institutional constraints of clinical testing.
Genetic determinism suggests a specific kind of causal connection between DNA and a phenotype in which the presence of a damaging variant in a gene should always lead to a predictable phenotypical outcome. Such a cause is fixed and remains effective over the life course. Contemporary developments in the field of genomics suggest that this kind of traditional genetic determinism is unlikely to hold sway even in a technology such as exome sequencing aimed at high penetrance monogenic or oligogenic causality. But it is unclear whether an alternative model of causality has replaced genetic determinism. Instead we may find laboratory geneticists engaged in a determined effort to make genotype-phenotype matches of increasingly uncertain causal provenance. Sequencing more genes simultaneously may thus render genetic causality, as interpreted in clinical contexts, also more tentative and uncertain. PRAGMATIST 
SEMIOTICS
To analyze how laboratory geneticists make clinically relevant causal connections between genotype and phenotype, I introduce pragmatist semiotics as a data analytical approach and demonstrate its added value in comparison with actor-network theory and social constructivism. The semiotics developed by Charles S. Peirce (1839 Peirce ( -1914 ) is a better fit for studying evolving signification than its well-known French counterpart.
2 Saussurean semiol-2 Surprisingly in light of the extensive semiotic literature drawn from de Saussure, few social scientists have applied Peirce's framework. Philosophers have aimed to reconcile the different versions of Peirce's writings and elaborate what Peirce meant, but their concern has been more with constructing a consistent rather than a usable system (see, e.g., ogy tends to study cultural sign systems abstracted from social contexts, bracketing both the referenced external world and the interpreting self in favor of a synchronic perspective on meaning (see, e.g., Emirbayer and Maynard 2011; Mertz 2007; Van Leeuwen 2005) . Peircean semiotics, in contrast, focuses on how meaning emerges from a flow of signs in action. People deploy and engage meanings within a context of interpersonal relations, individual emotions, and actions as they flow from past experiences, present constraints, and future aspirations (Patterson 2014) . Peirce (1992) also embedded the study of semiosis in a broader theory of inquiry where the goal was for the scientific community to move from doubt to certainty. Pragmatist semiotics then incorporates sensitivity to the temporality of meaning making.
According to Peirce, all thought, action, and interaction are fundamentally semiotic. Signification captures the social character of human life through three irreducible, interlinked parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant. "I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former" (Peirce 1998, p. 492) . The first of these elements is the sign, which we can think of as the signifier in the same way that smoke signifies a fire or that a word signifies a concept. The sign does not exist by itself but is always in relationship to an object. It is the utterance, pointing finger, picture, or whatever vehicle people use to represent an object in a certain way. The second related element is the object, any entity about which a sign signifies an actual thing "out there" or an idea in our head. The object places constraints on successful signification by specifying the sign. A sign represents an object and the object "determines" the sign. If these mutually constitutive relationships are proper, the sign stands for, substitutes, or exhibits the object and knowledge about an object through signs is possible.
Peirce's key insight was that meaning making is not an abstract but a dynamic and practical achievement. A sign needs to be understood as a sign. To capture this point, Peirce argued that every act of meaning making includes an interpretant-the effect of the sign-object through which any act of meaning making receives its definition. The interpretant is a reaction that the interpreter undergoes while making sense of a sign. A sign is not a part of an act of signification unless it has some kind of effect-an understanding, emotion, or action. A hiker lost in the woods can be alarmed by smoke fearing a forest fire or relieved because it may indicate human habitation. The sense of alarm or relief constitutes the interpretant. The interpreter then attends to aspects of the object conveyed through signs.
To add to the dynamic character of signification, Peirce presented meaning making as a continuous chain of sign-object-interpretant triads, in which an interpretant may become the sign for a further interpretant (Short 2007 ) and the sign can become an object for further signification. Interpretation takes place in a flow of action in which signs build upon each other. These chains of interpretation can extend over many years, building a closely knitted set of interactions spanning multiple experiences and histories as in the manifold facets of a relationship between a couple. Some chains of semiosis are limited and functional, others peter out inconclusively. While the object-sign-interpretant triangle is then the basic building unit of interpretation, each act of signification is situated within a flow of action.
Peirce was an incorrigible "splitter" of conceptual triads. 3 One set of distinctions is worth attending to for its analytical potential. Peirce distinguished three hierarchical categories of signs based on the kind of relationship between signs and objects: icons, indexes, and symbols. An icon refers to its object based on resemblance ("meow" for the noise a cat makes, a sense of the color green, a feeling of stifling heat, a selfie picture). An icon is a substitute: it represents intrinsic properties of the object without relying on an external (or secondary) referent. An index characterizes its object based on a contiguous relationship or, as Peirce put it, "a correspondence in fact" (a windvane on top of a house as a sign for wind direction, an x-ray image identifying an internal bone structure, a proper name, limping for injury). An index gets its meaning based on similarities and differences with something else. A symbol stands for an object on conventional, natural, or intellectual reasons, regardless of the likeness and the actual relationship to the object (as the word "horse" stands for the animal, or the Arabic numbers 1, 2, 3, stand for different quantities). Peirce saw the relationship between 3 I rely on a simplified version of Peirce's semiotics. I ignore the general architecture of potentiality, actuality, and generality that underlies the tripartite division within each type of signs as well as the trichotomy related to the sign-interpretant relationship (rheme-dicentargument) and the classification of signs itself (tone-token-type or qualisign-sinsignlegisign). Consequently, I am not going to use Peirce's 10 categories of signs. The analytical payoff of a full exposition of Peirce's semiotics remains limited in light of the additional complications of explaining the nuances Peirce put into each of the sign trichotomies and their interdependent relationships. In addition, Peirce intended his semiotics more as a logical classification system than as a set of tools to be used by social scientists. My choice is consistent with a leading semiotician, Richard Parmentier (2009) these three signs as hierarchical: symbols can successfully point to the external world only by embodying indexes, and they can only communicate information about their objects by incorporating icons. However, as Kohn (2013) explores to great effect, much communication occurs not through symbols but through indexes and icons. In fact, for the purpose of establishing a genotype-phenotype causal link, an iconic sign-object relationship may seem more natural and factual than a convention-based symbolic relationship.
A sign's interpretation further depends on the interpreter's habits of thought and action. The shape the interpretant ends up taking is defined partly by the concrete sign-object relationship but is also dependent upon the entire history of action, interpretation, and inference that interpreters bring to the interaction-their habits of thought and action, in which habits refer to a disposition to act in a certain way under the right circumstances (Dewey [1922 (Dewey [ ] 1988 . Habits of thought and action include emotional responses to situations, behavioral routines developed in response to similar situations, and collectively cultivated repertoires of action (Gross 2009 ).
The move from doubt to certainty rests on a process of signification in which objects become known over time through their association with signs, in effect through their semiotic use. Doubt, in Peirce's view (1992, pp. 114-15) , results from a recalcitrant or surprising experience challenging our preconceptions about the world and producing an uncomfortable state that paralyzes action. With inquiry, evidence, and assertions, beliefs can be fixed. Peirce then shows how creativity originates from habits (Joas 1996) . Peirce saw people moving through life with a set of preexisting beliefs, which they constantly confirm and tune through experiences. Experiences, however, do not give direct access to the external world but are themselves interpreted and thus fallible. It is this fallibility-the sense of error when our beliefs no longer match our experiences and the resultant process of correcting error-that allows us to conceive the world independent of our worldviews. We rely upon previously honed habits of thought and action to infuse signs with familiar ways of grounding the objects and known interpretants, but the encounter with new or surprising situations requires us to try out new significations to figure out what is going on. Yet, in this collective process of meaning making, 4 the sign-object relationship may resist creative imputations, and our habits of thought and action may also be at odds with the novel interpretant, especially when we consider its implications for further action.
Peirce then offers a theoretical framework that highlights the social and dynamic nature of meaning making to account for interpretive continuity as well as opportunities for and challenges to change. To bring pragmatist semiotics to the task at hand, we would expect that when laboratory geneticists interpret a set of genetic variants in light of a patient's symptoms to make a molecular diagnosis, these scientists will collectively develop interpretive habits that allow them to assign causes consistent with their professional training (and other relevant characteristics) and the institutional demands of genetic testing. These habits of signification may prove insufficient when the team members encounter anomalous situations, requiring more creative ways of causal classification. Yet, creativity will be circumscribed by the affordances (Gibson 1977) of the genetic variants, institutional constraints, and the anticipated use of the findings.
The pragmatist semiotic approach offers an intricate view of signification that contrasts with the strong focus on negotiated orders in social constructivism and the material semiotics of actor-network theory. These two perspectives are theoretically relevant because they have staked out positions about the possibility of creativity in scientific work and the boundaries between nature and culture, both issues central to clinical genomic decisionmaking.
In a programmatic statement, Collins and Yearley (1992) espoused the bedrock constructivist position that "the apparent independent power of the natural world is granted by human beings in social negotiations" (p. 310; my emphasis). Natural science is indefinitely interpretable, and scientists settle true and false science by collectively marshaling resources and developing tacit knowledge and credentials (see also Bijker, Hughes and Pinch 1989) . Creativity, in this perspective, is making statements that go against the grain and then trying to convince others that one is right by marshaling social and material resources (Collins 1985) .
Actor-network theory, in contrast, decenters the focus on humans as interpreters and instead gives humans and nonhumans a similar ontological status of actants, who/which become assembled over time in networks. The strength of the network is apparent through use and its ability to withstand challenges and to incorporate new elements. In this view, nature and society are the outcomes of material semiotic processes and there are no a priori differences. Attributing intentionality and interpretive prowess to humans becomes itself a semiotic act of delegation, enrollment, and distributing competencies. Novel creative findings become possible when new elements are enrolled in networks, requiring a reconfiguration of the entire network to accommodate a fit (Latour 1987) .
The sticking point between social constructivism and actor-network theory is the ontological status of nature (a broad category for all things non-social). Collins and Yearley embrace "social realism" but assert that nature is socially constructed. This gets them into trouble. One of the recurring problems in social constructivism is putting limits on what can be and what is socially constructed: Collins's work shows how scientific controversies start, but because he leaves the possibility of negotiation open, he has trouble accounting for why controversies close except by falling back on social placeholders such as "political climate" (Collins 1985, p. 165) . Network theorists argue instead that increasingly stronger semiotic associations and their networks enrolling things and scientists eventually close controversies (Callon 1986 ). Everything, the social and nature, is both real and constructed. However, because of their radical symmetry between people and things, it is unclear who or what drives actor-networks (Haraway 1997; Star 1991) .
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In social constructivism, the negotiated order is both the explanans and explanandum: scientists negotiate to settle controversies and controversies are settled when interpretative flexibility is resolved through negotiations. Peirce's approach breaks through this tautology by offering social constructivism the missing semiotic mechanisms for examining how negotiations occur, what ends up being negotiated, and when negotiations start or stop. A semiotic mechanism is a recurring interpretive process by which meanings in the social world come about (Tavory and Timmermans 2013) . A semiotic approach also shows that realism does not stop at artificial social borders. Peirce's notion of the interpretant rather than the interpreter leaves open the possibility of nonhuman action (see Peirce 1931-35) . However, if we are interested in how geneticists interpret exome data, it makes sense to relax actor-network theory's radical symmetry requirement and not simply focus on how things and people are assembled in new configurations but on scientists' interpretive processes instead ( Jerolmack and Tavory 2014; Kohn 2007) . Considering the strong semiotic foundation of actor-network theory, pragmatist semiotics constitutes not as much an alternative as an extension of actor-network theorizing. The sign-object-interpretant triad of pragmatist semiotics and the associated distinctions provide actor-network theorists with much more fine-grained semiotic tools to show the extent that things and people afford and constrain creative signification. Habits of thought and action point to the intent behind semiotic associations and create a space for fallibility as well as for the creative manipulation and play with semiotic networks. From a pragmatist semiotic perspective, genomic causality is not inherent or pregiven in social interactions/characteristics or in genes but in the meeting of the two in light of habits of thought and action.
METHODOLOGY AND SETTING
Over a three-year period between 2012 and 2015, I observed and audio recorded weekly data board meetings at one of the first U.S. academic centers to offer whole exome sequencing to clinicians. The data board meeting is modeled after tumor board meetings, in which a multidisciplinary team of clinicians meets on a regular basis to prospectively review cases and management decisions. My observations cover the first meetings in which the team discussed how to set up exome sequencing and the discussion from the first until more than 1,500 exome cases (in which a child patient and parents counted as three cases). The team invited me to attend the meetings because they initially had plans to apply for a research grant that required a social science component. 6 The sociological research on which this manuscript is based received IRB approval.
I analyzed the transcriptions following the guidelines of abductive analysis (Tavory and Timmermans 2013) . Abductive analysis is a qualitative data analytic approach aimed at theorizing (see also Swedberg 2012) . This approach depends on iterative processes of working with empirical materials in relationship with a broad and diverse social science literature. In this instance, my original interest was in understanding exome sequencing as a contemporary form of genetic determinism. I therefore coded the data first at the level of the genetic outcome for the patient, mapping the kinds of outcomes and how they were interactionally achieved. Then, I coded the discussion of candidate genes within a case. Here, I was interested in how the team made a match with the phenotype or dismissed a candidate gene for a variety of reasons. It became apparent, however, that in some instances the team tried to report a variant with several strikes against it. These instances were theoretically interesting because they suggest the creative reformulation of genetic causality and may provide alternatives to genetic determinism. This reminded me of the literature on creativity in pragmatism ( Joas 1996) . I decided to frame the observations as a semiotic process of interpreting genetic results. This insight required a reanalysis of the cases and discussions of variants in light of semiotic processes. The resulting analysis is then based on moving back and forth between literature and observations to account for the observed variation.
As a clinical test, exome sequencing is conducted to make a genetic diagnosis for a patient with a constellation of symptoms, either by ruling out a possible diagnosis or by discovering a gene associated with a disease. Often the patient already has undergone years of medical testing and acquired one or more clinical diagnoses but, because the same symptoms may indicate various genetically different diseases or because the same disease may consist of various types that can be differentiated genetically, a geneticist may recommend exome sequencing. Clinicians and patients hope that a genetic diagnosis will suggest or confirm treatments and a prognosis. The mode of inheritance may also indicate a recurrence risk in a subsequent pregnancy or the likelihood that the patient would pass on the condition to offspring.
While exome sequencing is aimed at high penetrance Mendelian disorders, the patients being sequenced had a broad range of often vague and complex phenotypes, including extensive developmental delay and serious physical disabilities, autism, cardiac abnormalities, neurological symptoms, and autoimmune and vision disorders. In the differential diagnosis, some of these symptoms may be associated with one or more particular genes, and, if that is the case, the clinician could request on the test's requisition form that specific genes be considered for analysis. More often, geneticists used exome sequencing as a means to explore a broad range of potentially diseasecausing genes. Importantly, however, clinical exome sequencing was not an open-ended exploration of the genome but the laboratory scientists interpreted the exome results in light of a specific phenotype. Thus only the genes that were associated with the patient's symptoms would be discussed at the data board meeting.
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Clinicians interested in prescribing a clinical exome test conducted pretest genetic counseling with the patient and family members if the test involved a child. They then requested the test with a requisition form on which they indicated the reason for testing and added a clinical note describing the patient's clinical symptoms. People being tested signed a clinical consent form and gave a blood sample. Laboratory personnel extracted DNA and sequenced the exomes. After checking quality measures and filtering out technically unconvincing variants, the analyst prepared the data for the data board meeting. The goal of the meeting was to decide which genetic variants caused the patient's symptoms.
The meetings took place in a small conference room with nine seats around a table, surrounded by a second row of about 20 seats. At each two-hour meeting, the team discussed the sequencing data of between 8 and 16 patients 7 The exception was trios, where the analyst would look at all de novo variants (see n. 11 below). However, in this case, the analyst would evaluate whether the variant was part of a "clinical gene," i.e., a gene included in HGMD or OMIM as associated with human disease. Also, for a more detailed description of the sequencing process (see Timmermans, Tietbohl, and Skaperdas, in press ).
by projecting the data in the form of an Excel document on a screen at the front of the room. The data analyst, or, if present, the ordering clinician, then went over a short anonymized description of the patient's clinical symptoms, followed by a detailed review of the genetic results in which promising alleles were highlighted. The genes under discussion appeared as rows in the document. Usually about 15 people-consisting of bio-informaticians, laboratory analysts, laboratory directors, geneticists, genetic counselors, clinicians, and support personnel-attended the meetings. Besides geneticists, some of the clinicians were specialists who referred a patient for clinical exome sequencing. They brought in-depth knowledge about the patient. In other cases, however, the team dealt with referrals and had limited knowledge about the patient. Although differences of opinion were common, the discussions were collegial and focused on determining the causal role of variants with appeals to scientific evidence.
PRAGMATIST SEMIOTICS OF CLINICAL EXOME SEQUENCING My analysis proceeds from simple to more complicated genetic interpretations. In straightforward cases, the team will evaluate a number of candidate genes and make a match or dismiss genes by double-checking the variant's biological characteristics and tracing back entries in genomic databases to the original research articles. While this interpretive approach explains the genetic causality, sometimes the team hopes to make a match where the evidence does not support this conjecture or, in the opposite situation, the team has too many causal matches. In the first situation, the team may opt to make tentative causal assignments after lengthy discussions. When faced with too many candidate genes, the team will cull variants to craft conventional single gene causality.
The Sign-Object-Interpretant Triad in Genetic Testing
Generally in medicine, symptoms-whether reported by patients or rendered visible by clinicians-are indicators for an underlying disease object. 8 8 My use of semiotics differs from the common applications of semiotic thinking in medicine, which goes at least back to the early Greeks when semiotics was integral to the theory and practice of medicine. Hippocrates emphasized that physicians practice medicine semiotically when deciphering symptoms as indications of medical problems. Semiology was one of five texts of Galenic thinking influential in the Middle Ages until the 18th century, when the "symptom was the shadow behind the disease" ( Johnston 2006, p. 148) . Medical semiotics as a bridge between theory and therapeutics allowed clinicians to locate symptoms into a preexisting order and by deduction then offer therapeutic instruction (Hess 1998) . Clinicians have also viewed medicine as a theoretical application of the decoding of signs (Burnum 1993) . The emerging field of biosemiotics has also adopted As such, the search for a molecular diagnosis continues a long-standing effacement of patients' experience-based knowledge about symptoms and even clinicians' authority of objective markers of disease for laboratory geneticists' molecular framing of disease (Armstrong 1995; Shostak and Waggoner 2011) .
Within this context of privileging professional expertise, genetic testing means at the most general semiotic level interpreting a list of genetic variants (signs) in light of a specific phenotype and family pedigree (object) for their pathogenicity and diagnostic value (interpretant). A sign reveals something, and due to the limits of human perception this revelation is inevitably partial: the sign focuses only some aspects of the object. In Peirce's conception, the sign allows and limits the production of various interpretants based on the object. A sign may stand for, denote, or represent an object and mean or signify an interpretant. The genetic variants have the potential to signify the patient's symptoms by establishing a causal relationship. It may seem unusual that, in this situation, the interpreters expect the sign to "cause" an object. However, this makes sense from the temporal order of genetic testing: patients consult geneticists because they may have been living with symptoms for years and geneticists perform the tests to signify these preexisting symptoms. "Causing" is in this medical context the form of representation the sign indicates; it does not denote a semiotic relationship between sign and object. The variants are classified in one of three categories suggestive of different levels of genetic causality: variant of uncertain significance (VUS), likely pathogenic, or pathogenic.
9 By default, there is a fourth category of nonreportable findings, that is, variants that came to the team's attention but did not warrant reporting out because they are deemed not causally implicated in the patient's symptoms.
The broad scope of exome sequencing produces about 20,000 variants in every person, in which each such variant constitutes a difference from the reference human genome. The director of the laboratory explained to a visitor: "The idea is not to spam people with data so that the meaningful things can rise."
10 The team has instituted several workflow processes to allow the "meaningful things" to emerge: the analyst creates a list of all the genes as- 9 There are two more categories of classification: benign and likely benign variants. But because they do not add clinical information, the laboratory geneticists in my study did not use these categories. The scale then goes from benign, likely benign, variants of uncertain significance, likely pathogenic, to pathogenic. In addition, geneticists may also report incidental findings, which refer to pathogenic variants not pertaining to the clinical phenotype. Here, I limit the analysis to genes that are reported out in the main three categories. 10 Quotes featured throughout the analysis are based on transcribed audio recordings from fieldwork, unless otherwise noted. semiotics as a theoretical paradigm for biology and medicine: the central premise is that life itself is based on signs and codes (Barbieri 2008). sociated with the phenotype based on the information available in two main curated and continuously updated databases, which scan the medical research literature to compile published gene variants responsible for human inherited disease: OMIM (Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man) and HGMD (Human Gene Mutation Database).
11 The analyst further filters variants for technical reasons and population frequencies. 12 The gene list and filters reduce the possible disease-gene correlations (Timmermans et al., in press ). In a typical patient about 10 genes with homozygous variants, 40-50 genes with compound heterozygous variants, and 250-300 with single heterozygous variants would be considered for interpretation. If the team sequenced a trio (typically a patient and the unaffected parents), they would consider an additional 1-2 de novo variants . 13 The analyst creates an Excel spreadsheet of these genetic variants, each with a long row of technical criteria and specifications attached to the gene and the allele. During the weekly meeting, the team discusses the suitability of these candidate genes in light of their fit with the phenotype. The question facing the team is whether any of these genetic variants should be reported out as the molecular cause of the patient's symptoms.
The intended establishment of genetic causality based on exome sequencing results can be seen in this exceptionally short and clear-cut case:
Gen couns: This one I don't have much. Oh, okay. So, there is this 35-yearold woman also diagnosed with retinitis pigmentosa. Her parents are related and she has three siblings who have retinal detachment, but she's the only one with the retinitis pigmentosa, and . . .
[pause]
Analyst: So, lots of regions of homozygosity, 9.5% of the genome. This is a proband-only case. No evidence of homozygous deletion and in the primary gene list, there is a variant within the region of homozygosity in the USH2A gene, and this is a known variant, an HGMD for retinitis pigmentosa. So I think this is it.
11 The OMIM is at https://www.omim.org/; HGMD is found at www.hgmd.cf.ac.uk/. 12 Candidate variants will be filtered against variants prevalent in the general population because these variants are unlikely to cause disease. Besides rarity, exome sequencing also assumes that causal genes are highly penetrant and deleterious. Pathological variants are thus more likely to be insertions, duplications, deletions, or splice-site mutations. Preservation in various species, the predicted biochemical severity, and the location of the amino acid change in the protein chain may further indicate pathogenicity. 13 De novo variants refer to new variants not observed in either parent, usually heterozygous in the patient. Homozygous means that both parents are heterozygous for the same variant. Compound heterozygous means that the patient inherited one rare variant from the mother and a different rare variant from the father. An inherited variant means that the patient inherited one variant from a parent. These variants are usually not disease causing.
The genetic counselor presents the case of a 35-year-old woman in a family where the parents are biologically related. Three of her siblings have a detached retina, but the patient is the only one with retinitis pigmentosa, a disease characterized by vision impairment due to the degeneration of cells in the retina. This is the phenotype consisting of symptoms and family history that forms the semiotic object requiring genetic signification. When going over the genetic variants projected on the screen in front of the meeting room (the list of possible signs), the analyst notes that the case was a proband-only case rather than a trio where she would compare the genetic variants of the patient with her unaffected parents to check for de novo variants. Then she confirms the parents' reported consanguinity genetically with 9.5% of regions of homozygosity larger than five megabases in the patient's genome, which would make the parents likely first cousins but may reflect multiple loops of consanguinity in the family tree (Carothers et al. 2006) . She then states that she found the likely genetic cause: a variant in the USH2A gene was associated with the phenotype in one of the two databases, and it was located in one of the regions of homozygosity (the sign signifying the object). The gene's location, its rare frequency in populations, its sequencing coverage, and other technical quality indicators further confirmed that the variant is "real." Consequently, the team considered the variant a likely pathogenic cause of the phenotype (the interpretant). Because phenotype and genotype match seamlessly based on previously published reports in a region of homozygosity, the team refers to cases such as the one presented above as "our version of a slam dunk." They tell ordering clinicians "this is as good as it gets" with exome sequencing in which "good" refers to their confidence in having nailed a molecular cause.
From a semiotic perspective, signification in genetic testing relates to whether the sign convincingly represents the object and, if so, what it says about the object. This match is not a pregiven but an active accomplishment. The team's task is to convincingly link the patient's phenotype-genotype to the causal relationships specified in the databases. Each successful signobject-interpretant match rests upon the team's acceptance of multiple iterations of embedded signification. The seemingly straightforward causal genetic connection between sign and object made in the meeting is actually presignified in the database: the analyst refers to the USHA2 gene as "an HGMD for retinitis pigmentosa" where "an HGMD" stands for a reliable match entered in that database. In this process of following up on earlier signification, every previous sign can become a new object that requires tracing back further signs in order to function as a causal phenotype-genotype match. Thus, in some cases, the analyst will project the actual OMIM or HGMD entries of a gene on the screen to show whether the gene's associated phenotype matches (part of) the patient's phenotype. Here, the gene becomes the object requiring signification with the database entry. Even that may be insufficient to make a match. The OMIM and HGMD databases offer references of published papers, and in some cases, the analyst will project the original journal articles and check the article for the exact phenotype associated with the genes or the publication's methodology. These published results may still remain debatable: the geneticists may dismiss some papers based on the methodology (e.g., animal vs. human research), the journal (one genetics journal was referred to as "the journal where good papers go to die"), or the authors (trustworthy researchers or not). By retracing the iterations of meaning associations, causes can be made and unmade.
This sign retracing indicates a general semiotic mechanism. In Peirce's theory, semiotic significations build upon each other with interpretants becoming signs in future semiotic iterations. The telos of signification is to better represent the object (Parmentier 1994) . While the sign represents the object, the object determines the sign-with "determined" Peirce referred to the principled linkage or reason for the sign to represent the object. Future semiotic iterations may consist of a look backward to reconstruct the grounds of the current signification and scrutinize previous processes of signification for the extent that they represent the object. This semiotic verification is likely to happen in instances of nonobvious categorization or generalization when the sign needs to become an instance of a broader, preestablished pattern but the match is not clear. By retracing the grounds of already present signification, the interpreters will determine whether a fit is warranted.
This practice raises the question, however, how much retracing is indicated? In principle, every chain can be extended infinitely. A skeptic of genetic causality can always further question methods, sampling, publication biases, and so on. Yet, in practice this only happens in rare circumstances; mostly the genetics team comes to a consensus that they found "it," something reportable, or that they have no findings. As Latour (1987) has pointed out, the process of turning observations into scientific facts involves following semiotic chains until they become incontrovertible for the task at hand, and this determination of incontrovertibility remains ultimately the team's judgment.
The extent to which the team will track chains of semiotic iterations is circumscribed with the pragmatic goal of genetic testing to answer a welldefined clinical question: The patient has symptoms, what are the genetic causes? This is critical because clinical exome sequencing aims to produce an answer that is useful for the medical management of the patient and therefore takes place in a particular regulatory and institutional context (Cambrosio et al. 2006) . Retracing semiotic signs is responsive to such institutional and regulatory demands. The mechanism helps distinguish what kind of activity clinical exome sequencing is (a clinical test on par with what competitor commercial laboratories offer) and what it is not (genomics laboratory research).
As a clinical testing facility, the laboratory has to meet federal quality standards to ensure accuracy, reliability, and timeliness of test results. The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), passed by Congress in 1988, regulate laboratory testing and require clinical laboratories to be certified by their state and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services before they can accept human samples for diagnostic testing.
14 Exome sequencing is considered a highly complex test, and the certification process covers standards for equipment, personnel, and procedures. In terms of reporting requirements, CLIA does not specify what qualifies as a reportable result but states that criteria for reporting out results should be made available upon request. This matters because it means that any reported finding must be backed up with evidence of causality, which the team in this study interpreted as published evidence.
The stakes of making exome sequencing work as a clinically competitive test also loomed large over the teams' discussions. Every report the team returned to an ordering clinician testified to their scientific acumen. They knew that their competitors would scrutinize whether they reported out the "right" findings, even if there was no clear right or wrong but rightness resided in the reasons for including or excluding a potential causal variant. They were also aware that clinicians of large health groups or insurance systems could submit the same patient's blood and clinical narrative to various laboratories as a test to compare turnaround time, the actual findings, and clinical utility of the report. Genetic counselors may also discuss discrepancies between reports on electronic bulletin boards, and some clinicians requested the raw sequencing data, presumably to reanalyze the results. The team's reputation, therefore, could suffer from being either overly cautious or too generous in matching phenotype and genotype.
While exome sequencing took place in a clinical laboratory affiliated with an academic center and most participating laboratory scientists and clinicians maintained research laboratories, the team was clear that they were engaged in a clinical task rather than in genetic research. They would stop speculative conversations with the notion that this may be a good research project but is irrelevant for the clinical question at hand, such as "we don't have evidence but it's an interesting potential research finding." Alternatively, they would routinely dismiss genes as "not a clinical gene," meaning 14 Genetic testing also requires accreditation by the College of American Pathologists or the Joint Commission. The Food and Drug Administration has also begun to consider regulating genetic tests. that nothing about the clinical implications was known about a gene in HGMD or OMIM. In each instance, such an assessment would mean the end of considering the gene as a potential cause, the end of chasing down a semiotic chain. The consequence of a clinical orientation is that many questions about the role of genetic variants will not even be asked because they do not meet the bar for reportable clinical findings. Similarly, much of the digging into the database entries, the actual journal articles, and research methodologies will become irrelevant once it becomes clear to the team that further exploration is unlikely to offer a useful clinical answer.
Pragmatist semiotics offers a handle on studying genetic causality through an analysis of when and how the team questions or solidifies associations between signs and objects for the task of providing a clinical answer responsive to institutional and regulatory requirements. The analyst's conclusion "So I think this is it," with the "it" referring to a definitive genetic cause, may constitute proof of a traditional form of genetic determinism. But this is not a common outcome. The team is only able to discuss a dozen cases in a two-hour period because most interpretations are complex and ambiguous. Instead, the "this is it" statement in this simple case reflects the habits of thought to naturalize genetic causality. Making a pathogenic causal connection means importing a link from the literature based on similarity. In Peirce's classification of signs, the sign as it relates to its object is treated as fundamentally iconic-that is, dependent on formal resemblance-with the indexical work of retracing causality in the literature rendered invisible. 15 The mode of inquiry is inductive: we find another instance of something we already knew. This kind of causality is remarkable in light of what it is not: there is no discussion of causal pathways or the gene's functionality. The variant's causal reality is established with the changes it is assumed to explain. Causality is additive in genetic testing: the published literature has set a precedent of what was already known (see also Rapp 2000, pp. 206-8) . The already known part does not require a complete overlap of symptoms: as long as some of the patient's phenotype is consistent with the list of keywords in the database the variant will be reported out. Rather than deterministic, the causal fit may be loose. 15 Digging deeper into Peirce's taxonomy of signs, we can make sense of treating something (which suggests a symbolic and indexical relationship) as an icon by further exploring the kind of interpretant (rheme, dicent, argument). What we then add is the subtle but critical shift whereby something that could be symbolic is perceived as iconic. Irvine and Gal (2000) refer to a similar process as rhemization: signs that once functioned as indexical are interpreted in terms of iconic essentialism. Put differently, what is going on in the exome team meeting is a process of reification whereby the literature as human mediator is erased for natural causality.
Failed Signs
Only about 25% of patients received a molecular diagnosis after clinical exome sequencing Yang et al. 2014) . Even in reports with pathogenic results, the team considered many more candidate genes. Most of the discussion time at the meeting then consists of going through candidate genes that will fall short. The reason for the shortfall is the inverse of establishing a causal link: when retracing the evidence an unconvincing match is found.
The semiotic mechanism of retracing signs emphasizes that not anything goes: the object needs to be compatible as the determinant for the sign. This is the extent to which semiotics has an undeniably realist dimension: objects constrain representation, and signs are not infinitely attachable. Rather than specifying objects, some signs are left dangling until they are dismissed. They enter the discussion indexically but without attachment to an object; such signs become mere noise. What causes a lack of successful signification? Signification may fail due to characteristics of the sign, the object, and the relationship between the two. In each case, any retracing of semiotic chains does not turn up support for a causal connection. Failure to signify is, of course, also a semiotic outcome, but in the context of exome sequencing it is negative: the gene will not be reported out, and it therefore does not exist as a signifier for the ordering clinician or the patient.
A sign does not fit the object.-As mentioned before, the data analyst brings only genetic variants to the data board meeting if these variants had some kind of known prior association with the patient's phenotype. This initial association, however, is often imprecise and overly inclusive. In such a case, the analyst errs on the side of including every gene that matches any broad descriptor of the patient's symptoms. Because genes are associated with multiple conditions, many variants will still need to be evaluated on their match with this patient's specific phenotype. One of the reasons for having a data board meeting is to evaluate such tentative matches. Here is how one clinician eliminated a gene from consideration because of a bad fit with the phenotype of progressive spastic paraplegia: "The phenotype that's associated or that's been assigned to that variant is nothing like this. It's just a pure neuropathy. So, no, it wouldn't even fit clinically." The genetic variant is real in the sense that it meets the technical criteria of a convincing variant. The clinician, who is also an expert on the genetics of ataxia, does not find the gene's association with the patient's phenotype credible. In other situations, the analyst declares a mismatch based on the HGMD description of the phenotype associated with the gene or variant. The analyst would move on to the next candidate gene. The sign does not signify the object; it becomes an irrelevant feature of the patient's genome.
An object is too vague or specific for the signification.-For signification to work, the object needs to be sufficiently defined for the current signs to further represent it. In exome sequencing, if the phenotype is too vagueor, conversely, overly specific-the test is unlikely to produce reportable results. A laboratory director noted during a meeting that the genetic results depend on the number of potentially clinically relevant genes, which in turn depends on the accuracy of the description of the phenotype on the test requisition form. In another situation, a clinician asked whether the team could redo the analysis with a more specific keyword: "Would you mind, just in the background, just rerun with cirrhosis as opposed to a more vague term like hepatosplenomegaly, and just see if there's an alternate gene list that comes up." Causal attribution then depends on a detailed and precise phenotype. In fact, the team considers the lack of standardization in clinical observations a major impediment for exome sequencing because clinical descriptions set the course for the interpretation of sequencing results. Even using a proximate term-for example, mental retardation instead of developmental delay-may change the number of genes that come to the team's attention.
A sign should fit the object but the relationship does not work.-"I think we found it." A clinician was confident that exome sequencing had identified the causal agent of his patient's extensive developmental delay. He directed attention to a compound heterozygous variant in gene SLC986, but when he found out that both alleles were inherited from the father, he disappointedly reversed his opinion: "It doesn't make any sense." In this particular patient, in spite of the seemingly perfect fit with the clinical description of the gene, the inheritance pattern spoke against making a match because the team would have expected the father to be affected. They decided not to report anything out. 16 In semiotic terms, signification fails because a promising iconic relationship is trumped by other implied signobject relationships that point to a stronger indexical signification-in this case the mode of inheritance trumps the match between genotype and phenotype.
A major brake on any attempt at genetic determinism is the realization that with current technologies genetic matches remain elusive. Geneticists cannot wish causality into existence; the variants have a deeply material structure. In a project aimed at signification, such shortfalls are disappointing. Even if the disease seems obviously genetic because it has affected sev-eral relatives or even if the patient's situation is poignantly tragic in a way that a genetic diagnosis would provide tangible benefits, it is difficult to overcome the reality of a wrong inheritance pattern, a technically weak finding, a common variant, or an unknown function.
Instead of the one-gene-one-trait dogma of genetic determinism, we find what can be called the genomic causality paradox: the more sophisticated the DNA sequencing and the broader the scope of genetic testing, the more likely geneticists will see causality thwarted by countless unknowns, uncertainties, and anomalous findings that do not conform to what is familiar about the genome. The high failure rate resides in exome sequencing's ability to map the entire coding region of a patient's genome. In the past, geneticists ordered single gene tests or gene panels where every gene included on the test was carefully vetted and extensively studied. While laboratories still discovered new variants for these genes, they had a sense of how the unexpected finding fit with what was known about the gene. Each unexpected finding became by default a VUS, but there would rarely be more than one or two VUS for a patient. With exome sequencing, thousands of genes may come to attention of which little is known, few people have familiarity with the genes, and the literature is equivocal. It does not make sense to list all these variants in the residual category of VUS. Laboratory geneticists respond to uncertain causality with reconciliation efforts. They rely on more indirect clues of the gene's pathogenicity, but they lack the tacit knowledge to confidently estimate causal probability.
The mechanism responsible for a gene's failed causal reality is semiotically discoverable. Failed genomic causality is the counterpart interpretant of slam-dunk causality. The same retracing of signs that is used to make a clinically convincing causal connection is also deployed to dismiss candidate explanatory genes. Retracing semiotic chains runs into a stop, revealing either a misfit or an absence of fit due to gaps, omissions, or contradictions in the research literature. The reality of the variant as an explanatory sign remains vulnerable to all the embedded elements of previous significations and the implied relationships that need to be present for the causal signification to work. Every link in this chain can "betray" the phenotypegenotype match: signs may falter because they point away from causality; objects may be too vague to allow for signification; and indexical relationships may crumble under closer scrutiny. Consequently, indexicality falls apart.
Promoting Weak Signs
Up until now, we have seen how laboratory geneticists make successful genotype-phenotype matches and how many promising variants fail to signify. While the team's collective judgment greatly matters, the process has been relatively uncreative in the sense that little new knowledge has emerged. Instead we find a dominant set of habits of thought that inductively interprets genetic variants in light of the broader clinical genetics literature. Semiotics, however, is not a question of stimulus-response where the object's characteristics determine the signs. If the biology of genes decided what should be reported out, there would be no need for a data board meeting. Bioinformaticians could write an algorithm that correlated the genetic sequence with the databases and create a list of reportable findings. The actual process is more creative: some signs can be made compatible with objects by fostering new semiotic iterations that go beyond the typical habits of retracing phenotype-genotype connections in the medical literature. Such discussions offer an antidote to an overly realist impression of Peircean semiotics in which nature would have the unmediated last word. It also moves us from induction to abduction.
When faced with a lack of reportable findings where geneticists think there should have been results, the team may try to save a genetic variant as a cause by making ad hoc adjustments in their usual evaluation criteria. Such adjustments are not straightforward because the team goes against what the gene's characteristics and literature seem to indicate. Consequently, such discussions are time-consuming at the data board meeting and the result may still be an impasse because the team is concerned about setting a precedent or making an exception that would not survive outside scrutiny.
Rather than retracing signs, the general mechanism in these situations is a reconfiguration of semiotic chains. As linguistic anthropologists have also noted in other settings (Kockelman 2007; Parmentier 2014; Silverstein 2003) , interpreters have the ability to tinker creatively with the criteria and intent of signification. They may switch object and sign around, bring in multiple signs at once to reframe an object, or try to develop novel interpretants that no longer fit their usual set. This creative expansion and exploration, however, is cumbersome and unstable because it can easily be challenged by its deviation of the common habits of thought and action.
In these discussions, a clear pattern emerges of who initiates the rescue operations of at-first-sight weak variants: the clinicians cognizant that they may face desperate families empty-handed tend to push for inclusion of candidate genes. Clinicians are also aware that genes not reported out may never come back to attention unless there is some kind of record. Laboratory staff members reply that there may be thousands of genes that they filtered out but may prove in the future to be relevant and that making an exception for some genes could open the floodgates for reporting meaningless information. While we could catalogue such clashes as an instance of opposing laboratory-clinical worldviews, a semiotic analysis instead highlights how the team, in spite of divisions, may rehabilitate weak causal genetic variants by creatively reconfiguring signs. The disciplinary leanings then infuse this process of creative signification.
Changing the sign.-The expectation is that a sign will be evaluated based on the meaning with which it enters the semiotic process. However, ad hoc adjustments of signs can change their meaning profoundly. In the following exchange, a variant is reported even though it is associated with the opposite phenotype:
Analyst1: [The clinical note for the patient] says large head circumference, but long, slender tubular body.
Clinician: Yes, [the gene under discussion is] actually a growth retardation and this patient has over . . .
Analyst2: Overgrowth.
Analyst1: It's like the opposite.
Clinician: Pretty much the opposite. Right, so . . .
Analyst1: That large head circumference.
Analyst2: That's relatively . . . relative microcephaly.
Geneticist: And that's a very potentially interesting thing. Here, the same genes for overgrowth are also the same genes for undergrowth, as we know with . . .
Lab dir1: With Sotos, with NSD1.
Geneticist: Well, with Beckwith-Wiedemann and image syndrome and in fact there is. . . . So 3-M is an undergrowth syndrome which is thought to be in the pathway of image syndrome, for which mutations and a different place of the protein gives overgrowth so . . .
Lab dir2: You wouldn't report it?
Clinician2: Well, I wouldn't . . . you know, I would report it just . . . In this case, when retracing the semiotic chains the gene that came up in the discussion was primarily associated with undergrowth (small head) in a patient with large head circumference. A geneticist proposed that in some conditions the same gene could be involved in both under-and overgrowth but that was not what the HGMD clinical description stated for the gene under consideration. The team is leaning against reporting the variant until the analyst points out that not only are both variants of high technical quality but they are also strongly associated with pathology. The variants are therefore reported out, even though the literature suggests otherwise. This mode of inquiry is no longer inductive; the geneticists are no longer classifying a new instance in existing categories. Instead, faced with an anomalous finding, the laboratory geneticists speculate about how the finding can be reconciled. Peirce labeled this mode of reasoning abduction. It is an inference to the best explanation, an answer to the question: what is needed to make an anomalous finding "a matter of course?" (Peirce 1931-35, 5.188) . While creative, abductive reasoning is speculative and requires further inquiry to firm up the inference. Here, we see how the inference gains traction with the quality and kind of variant and with the realization that some genes have opposite phenotypical effects. The interruptions and exclamations ("wow") capture the affective excitement of this novel interpretant.
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Invoking absent signs.-Many issues about genes, their functionality, and their role in disease are unknown, and occasionally the team will use this lack of knowledge to the advantage of reporting out a variant. The basic form of the argument is that if we knew what we don't know, it might explain the patient's symptoms. In genetics this is not such a big leap as it may seem to outsiders. The fact that lack of knowledge is not a barrier to reporting genes out is built into one of the formal reporting categories: "Variant of uncertain significance" (VUS). However, even a VUS suggests a modicum of pathological causality: otherwise, the team could report to the ordering clinician countless variants of uncertain significance in every case. Some genes considered barely fit in the VUS category and require further ad hoc adjustment to make a case for reporting them out. Such attempts at ad hoc signification happen frequently in patients who have only one allele for a candidate pathological variant in a recessive disorder. The team needs 17 I have presented the interpretant as a cognitive realization of pathogenicity, but that is an oversimplification. The interpretant also has a detectable collective affective dimension, a simultaneous sense of excitement and trepidation that the team will find something (Hirschauer 1991, 279-319) . Especially incidental findings-that is, where a patient is examined for developmental delay but the team also detects cancer susceptibility variants in the child and mother (incidental findings)-create a sense of "Oh shit, what are we doing to these families?" The team wants to make the technology work because they invested resources in the technology and operate in a competitive environment with commercial laboratories offering similar sequencing. At the same time, clinicians and genetic counselors in the room will emphasize that the long table of variants represents a family desperate to get an answer or parents who may be devastated by the results. This "emotional solidarity" (Collins 1981 ) also informs the determination to report findings out. two alleles to report a recessive variant. Otherwise the patient is a carrier, which means that they should not have the disease phenotype. As one clinician noted, "I like that one a lot. So, that causes SPG30 [spastic paraplegia-30], so that's a hereditary spastic paraparesis which is exactly the category that this patient would fit into. . . . The problem is, it's recessive and we only have one variant."
The issue in this and similar cases discussed at the data board meeting is that the genetic variant fits the phenotype beautifully but the team cannot explain a phenotype with a carrier status. During the discussion, an analyst stated the consensus, "I think the reason not to report it would be that we haven't typically reported carrier states, but if we have any suspicion that we're missing a second one." Indeed, the general rule has an "if" attached to it. Even though we did not find a second allele, if the second allele is actually there, we can report the gene out. Thus, if the gene is covered 96% instead of 100%, 18 then there is a theoretical chance that the missing allele is in the remaining 4%. The team could figure this out with follow-up Sanger sequencing for the gene in question, and they may leave the final determination pending Sanger sequencing. In the end, the final call is difficult. Not mentioning the gene in the report would mean that the gene was considered insignificant. A geneticist anticipated external scrutiny when he said, "I mean I wouldn't want [the ordering physician] to think, 'Okay, they're not smart enough, they didn't see it.' If it's in there, then they know that we saw it, we just, we're having a difficult time with the interpretation." Reporting out a weak variant then anticipates future utility. But mentioning the variant even as a VUS may imply a weak causal explanation where basic assumptions of genetics suggest the odds are exceedingly low for any kind of genotype-phenotype causality.
Changing the object.-In exome sequencing, the phenotype typically precedes knowledge of genes: the team selects candidate genes based on a description of the symptoms ticked off in a checklist on the requisition form or culled from the patient's clinical records. In some situations, however, the phenotype as a reference point for the genotype becomes undone, and the team identifies variants in a gene previously linked to disease but to a phenotype distinct from that being tested (Singh 2016) . Which should prevail: the genetic information or the phenotype? Rather than dismissing the candidate gene due to a bad match, the team may presume that the phenotype is incomplete or wrongly characterized.
The first time the team experienced this disconnect was in a 15-year-old patient who tested positive for a gene that fit some of her symptoms but was 18 Sequencing coverage in exomes indicates whether a particular coding region or gene is reliably and uniformly sequenced. also associated with a lack of tears, an issue not reported on the requisition form. The team suggested to the clinician that they ask the patient and her parents whether she had cried. The parents reported that their daughter had not cried but simply thought that she was not prone to crying. The genotype suggested that the phenotype was different from what the clinicians thought ailed the young woman. A laboratory director presented the case at a conference as an example of how genotype may discover unobserved phenotypes.
These experiences early on in the team's sequencing practice gave them confidence in what they and others in the field of genomics would later refer to as "expanding the phenotype" (Klein et al. 2014) , which meant that, in some instances, the genes are given primacy in what the phenotype should be rather than what is reported in the patient or known about a condition. In the next exchange, a promising variant fits the phenotype, but because it is dominant, the parent from whom it is inherited (in this case the father) should have the same condition. But the medical file does not mention anything about other instances of the patient's symptoms in the family history. Rather than abandoning the variant, the team suggests the father may be undiagnosed with the condition.
Analyst: And then there were a few inherited heterozygous variants. This one is actually a nonsense variant and it's an HGMD variant and this is a dominant condition so I was asking if the dad. . .
Lab dir [interrupting]: What is the condition?
Clinician: Optic neuropathy.
Analyst [continues]: . . . if the dad could possibly have some kind of phenotype.
Gen couns: Well with optic nerve atrophy there's a lot of variability in penetrance. I mean it could be up to 100%. The lowest has been reported about 40%, so it could be from 40% to 100%. On average it's high, but it can be pretty low. He's 37 years old.
Lab dir: So early on optic atrophy does the patient . . . I mean obviously the child is very severely affected, but would the dad [be]?
Gen couns: But it can vary so the age of onset could be a late onset. The case could be very, very mild and not present until adulthood.
Lab dir: But is there any more refined testing that the patient would report just that I can't see well that [the opthalmologist] can do to determine whether the dad is on the course towards optic atrophy?
Gen couns: I mean we probably want to just look at his nerve.
The team makes a provisional match between phenotype and genotype in light of further follow-up testing of the phenotype, in this case by checking the father's optic nerve. They felt confident making this recommendation because of the varying penetrance of the variant. In essence, the team decides that if the father has optic atrophy, then the variant explains the son's diagnosis. The team thus suspected a disease in a person who was not even their patient. Rather than genetics having the last word on the patient's diagnosis, genetic variants suggested further phenotypical testing. The original sign (genetic variant) became an object dependent for its signification on changes to the original object (patient symptoms). That original object, rather than forming a constraining ground for the intended signification, is now turned into a sign that may point to causality. Creativity resides here in speculating about the indexicality of the original object: Are the symptoms really what the clinician reported or is there something different wrong with the patient? As befits the hypothetical and provisional nature of abductive reasoning, such discussions further complicate a straightforward gene-symptom causal relationship because causality is contingent on additional phenotypical findings suggested by the candidate genes. If the phenotype corresponds to predictions, the gene must play a causal role.
Changing the relationship between sign and object.-Including a variant that in other circumstances would be dismissed requires a persuasive argument to disarm the weaknesses of the case. In such exchanges, any mixture of scientific and moral stakes can be marshaled. As noted earlier, in clinical genetics the published literature offers a powerful arbiter on whether a genotype may explain a phenotype. Rather than following the chains of interpretation down from database to journal articles, the team will try to send chains of significations in new directions and in the process complicate what should be a straightforward causal connection.
The extent to which some team members were willing to go to report genes out became apparent in a family with a son who at three months of age required a heart transplant because of dilated cardiomyopathy. The parents were told that this was probably due to an infection and that it was highly unlikely that the condition would recur in another child. Unfortunately, the next sibling had the same cardiomyopathy and at three months of age also required a heart transplant. In spite of a 5.8 megabase region of homozygosity on chromosome 3, exome sequencing only produced some easily dismissable variants because they were without cardiac connotations, were hemizygous variants on the X chromosome that the mom carried as well, or were in non-HGMD compound heterozygous genes. Then, there was one inherited heterozygous variant in the SCN5A gene associated with cardiac issues reported in HGMD. However, that variant had three strikes against it: it was inherited from the father and he was (presumably) unaffected; it was seen at 0.2% in the population, which was much higher than the consensual threshold of 0.1%; and it was associated with Brugada syndrome. This syndrome usually presented as ventricular tachycardia and sudden death rather than with the boy's symptoms. The team was torn about whether to even report this variant out. The situation involved "two brothers that present with a similar [rare] genetic clinical phenotype" which meant, a laboratory director argued, that, "there has to be something genetic, correct?" His colleague decided that they should report it as a "barely VUS" because if the family had done a cardiac panel, this mutation would have been reported: "If it's the only variant in a cardiomyopathy-related gene that popped up, that sort of fits our criteria." However, he noted that if the parents wanted another child "I wouldn't bet on this one right here [SCN5A] ." At the end, the first director summed up the consensus: "We didn't find it. I mean, this might be it, but we didn't find it."
In this instance, the team convinced themselves to report a gene that they agreed should not be reported out because, if the family had requested a cardiac panel, the team would have included it as the sole positive finding. However, the reason for exome sequencing is exactly that it is not like a cardiac panel but has a different scope and different reporting rules. This kind of ad hoc reasoning was also influenced by the concern that as a genetic counselor put it, "We can do better" for families who have several children with similar genetic syndromes. She elaborated: "It's a failure on our part of not bothering to say anything about the genetics because the family wouldn't probably think about that until it's the second or third one. It's just wrong on our part to not get involved with that." Here, the genetic test transcends the mundane reality of explaining a phenotype. The moral conundrum of a family with two children with serious heart disease after being told that the cause for the first child's health problems was not genetic produced a professional imperative to report something out. Including the variant on the report as a VUS did then not only reflect a presumed molecular but also a professional relationship. In Peirce's taxonomy of signs, a barely existing indexical sign-object relationship takes on symbolic dimensions because the reported variant stands for the conventional professional trust of doing something for this patient.
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Including genes where the variant's characteristics seem to argue against a match may at first sight form the strongest indications of genetic determinism because in these instances the team moves the boundaries of the known phenotype-genotype relationship and goes beyond an additive form of causality. The laboratory geneticists diagnose patients with symptoms that are unknown to clinicians; redefine disease categories; alter the causal associations of genes; presume causality based on unknown biological factors and professional imperatives; and change the purpose of genetic testing. Rather than explaining a phenotype with genetic variants, the team is now trying to discover what a gene does. The problem with viewing this as genetic determinism is that nothing has been genetically determined.
Instead, we find further evidence of reconciliation efforts to address uncertain genomic causality. Geneticists' conditional assignment of causality with the VUS reporting category demonstrates a work-around of the persistent uncertainty of genetic variants that do not meet the criteria of a more straightforward or likely pathogenic relationship. When using the VUS category, the genetic team acknowledges that more research is needed about the variant but doing so goes beyond the scope of the clinical test. Once this research becomes available or, alternatively, when the patient's symptoms change, the variant may indeed be causally implicated or it may have to be classified as a benign polymorphism. In light of this uncertainty, the team could have left the variant off the report, but the geneticists hedge their authority by assigning provisional causality. Their interpretation is an expert opinion, an interpretant dependent on group reasoning rather than an external referent. As Porter (1996) has shown, over the course of the 20th century this kind of expert authority has become less credible than authority grounded in standards and scientific evidence. For that reason, these inferences remain vulnerable to the question of whether the team can back up its conclusion. Reflecting genomic reconciliation, these kinds of connections then indicate a suspended causality: right now there is little evidence that the genes are causal but they may be in the future.
Something semiotically fascinating is going on in all of these instances of reconfiguring semiotic chains. The team has developed a habit of thought and action institutionalized in requisition forms and the organizational flow of sequencing in which a series of signs (genotype) is called upon to explain the object (phenotype). The unusual nature of these interpretations is apparent in the reversal of the sign-object relationship when, in the act of signification, the sign is itself turned into a stable object depending for its status on further changes in the original object or additional signs. Rather than smoke signifying a fire producing relief for a weary hiker, we actually notice a fire and wonder whether we will hear songs, smell roasted marshmallows, and see the smoke repel mosquitoes-all these signify a campfire. The purpose of signification has been swapped. Such creative reconfigurations are, however, difficult to pull off. Even if the geneticists really hope to construct semiotic links, interpretation runs in the recalcitrance of established semiotic chains. The prevailing logic is that smoke signals fire rather than the other way around. Furthermore, this kind of reverse genetic causality is tentative. The sign is conditionally assigned to the object contingent on other chains of signification falling into place. Such reflections generate only a wisp of causality. Basically, the team offers an abductive hunch that these genes may have something to do with the phenotype but there is no way to prove it at present; causality depends on future verification.
Demoting Strong Signs
Occasionally the team faced the opposite problem: instead of no causality where they expected a genetic explanation, they found too many credible genetic causes. Considering the low success rate of exome sequencing, we may expect that the team would welcome finding multiple causal variants. More genes may indicate polygenic interaction or modifier effects. In reality, the team actively demoted some variants to prioritize the ones they thought were truly responsible for the phenotype. Unlike the previous section where the team went to great lengths to overcome their own skepticism, demoting variants is easily accomplished on technical grounds or on fit with the phenotype.
Besides retracing signs and reconfiguring semiotic chains, we see a third major semiotic mechanism: actively comparing signs against each other in the same set. Too many similar signs weaken the object's signification. Comparing signs fits nicely with Peirce's notion that the purpose of signification is to better represent the object. An abundance of signs threatens to weaken what the object represents. Working with the tension of signs representing objects and objects determining signs, it is relatively easy to cull signs for a cleaner signification by downgrading some semiotic connections.
In a patient with intermittent motor weakness, the analyst found two variants in the KCNJ18 gene and a novel heterozygous variant in SCN9A. Both variants were technically convincing but did not completely fit the phenotype. The team debated which one to report as "likely pathogenic" because they argued that "you can't have two likely pathogenic variants." Of course, one always could have two likely pathogenic variants on one reportthe result box in the final report is large enough to accommodate such findings and genomic research increasingly points to the role of multiple genetic variants-but the working assumption of exome sequencing is that single genes underlie diseases. Reporting two variants would muddle up the causal picture, making these variants equivalent while the team presumes that one variant must be more important than the other. Demoting one of the variants or leaving it off the report makes this a self-fulfilling assumption. Similarly, in several other cases in which the team had found a pathogenic or likely pathogenic gene with several VUS's, the team opted not to report the VUS because doing so would "distract" from the more promising gene. However, if the team had only had the VUS, they likely would have decided to include it on the report.
The few times the team considered hints of more sophisticated genomic causal relationships, they ended up dismissing this possibility. Because exome sequencing depends on multiple reads of the same genetic information, the technology is able to pick up the possibility of mosaicism (in which one individual has cells with different genotypes). In isolated instances, the analyst mentioned a mosaic inheritance pattern in trios when one of the parents showed different variant ratios across sequencing reads. Whether this information mattered for explaining the phenotype depended on whether mosaicism was reported in the literature for this gene. Similarly, the possibility of a digenic mode of inheritance (interaction between two genes) may be raised to account for unsatisfactory findings in one gene: "There's a COL6A1 variant, as well. This one's been seen in the population before, though. It's not. . . . The amino acid is conserved, and this is, also, collagen VI. I don't know if this could be, like, digenic or something. I don't know." Only when the literature confirmed that two genes are necessary for a phenotypical effect did the team give credence to digenic modes of inheritance.
What is at stake in these demotions is not the way an individual genetic variant informs a phenotype but what the whole set of findings communicates about causality. As in the "failed signs" section, the process of signification results in removed signs and voided signification, but in this instance the failure to signify originates with the interpreters reconciling their decisions with their disciplinary background. The difference resides with how the signs as a form of mediation symbolically communicate exome sequencing to the outside world. While the geneticists are willing to creatively expand the meaning of single genes, they are reluctant to use a clinical test to question the bedrock assumption of single causality.
What does this reluctance tell us about the role of a biological reality as one of the critical grounds for signification? Does the demotion of signs signify an instance where the team simply decides what reality should be? It does not. The critical issue is that the team does not imply causality where genotype-phenotype connections are uncertain but instead inhibits signification. This is an important difference. We have seen that it requires extensive evaluation of evidence to make a convincing case for genomic causality. The odds for a sequenced patient are good that no cause will be found because much can easily go wrong when retracing semiotic chains. When demoting signs, the team does not cull variants randomly but uses the technical and biological weaknesses present in all but the most slam-dunk instances as a means to void the signification. They thus use these failed or weak signs to their advantage to stop signification. The team's active prioritization of variants is striking in light of the promise of sequencing the whole exome. Pointing to the historical path dependence of the conceptualization of diseases, Shostak, Conrad, and Horowitz (2008) have noted the limited ability for genetic information to redefine established phenotypes. A similar kind of path dependency has permeated the field of clinical genetic testing with its experience with single genes. The decade-long availability of tests for single genes or limited gene panels dependent on a careful evaluation of symptoms has created a habit that many so-called genetic diseases must be Mendelian. The number of signs that are allowed to signify the object is determined somewhat arbitrarily: "As soon as it is more than two or three [reported results]," a laboratory director stated, "it becomes meaningless. The variants are real, [but] the interpretation is sketchy." When zooming in on one gene and prioritizing variants, the team crafts a narrative that stays closely to the one-gene-one-trait principle. To use the Lee et al. study as an example, only in 29 of 213 patients who received a molecular diagnosis did that team report more than one pathogenic-likely pathogenic variant . 20 Exome sequencing has opened the door for multiple matches, but causality brokers closely guard that door to let in only the most promising genes that conform to Mendelian genetics.
CONCLUSION
Laboratory geneticists interpreting next-generation genetic test results connect the dots of genetic causality by identifying genetic variants that explain clinical phenotypes. Situated in a broader research discipline that is moving to a multicausal postgenomic paradigm, clinical exome sequencing still adheres to a simpler model of genetic causality where the abundance of genetic information is sacrificed for single gene or few genes causality. Exome sequencing results, however, chafe at Mendelian causality: producing too many variants of uncertain causal provenance, finding no causes where one would expect them, or discovering difficult-to-interpret anomalous findings. Much of the realignment of a postgenomic world takes place across research laboratories and epidemiological studies. Yet, as causality brokers, geneticists also work to reconcile the shifting paradigm at the clinical laboratory level. Depending on the relevant signs, laboratory geneticists may demote or upgrade the causal role of genetic variants. Their interpretive work constitutes clinically relevant genetic causality because it ultimately distinguishes pathogenic from benign polymorphisms in individual patients.
Causality brokering following exome sequencing has profoundly changed the work of geneticists. Exome sequencing altered the modus operandi of clinical geneticists from working deductively (hypothesizing which gene would be responsible for a patient's symptoms based on the literature and then verifying one's hypothesis with a gene test) to working inductively (ordering an exome test and interpreting what comes up in light of a patient's phenotype), and occasionally abductively (starting from a surprising variant and then wondering about its effects). Most single genes used in tests prior to exome sequencing were individually validated, while with exome sequencing the laboratory has to evaluate whether the slate of genetic findings is trustworthy and clinically relevant. Rather than a specialist in a limited number of well-established genes, the geneticist conducting exome sequencing needs to be able to work with big data and evaluate candidate genes within the broader scientific literature. This transition, however, is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. For all the abundance of genetic information, the interpretation of exome data depends on a precise description of a phenotype and on accuracy and completeness of genetic information compiled in databases.
In spite of these changes in their modus operandi, laboratory geneticists are more likely to offer a Mendelian interpretation than a sophisticated postgenomic interpretation of the exome data. Laboratory scientists using exome sequencing for a clinical purpose face a genomic causality paradox: the broader the scope of sequencing technologies, the more difficult it becomes to precisely locate genetic causality. Instead, the team finds many variants of uncertain or even unknown clinical significance, locates some hints of mosaicism or digenic interactions, and faces the ungraspable role of environmental mediators. While they may rehabilitate some promising genes by reporting them with qualifiers (such as through the VUS category), the resulting causality is tentative: pending either additional knowledge about clinical functionality of the genes or, alternatively, changes in the patient's phenotype that bring the gene closer to the published genotypes.
The genomic causality paradox is largely a consequence of the lag effect between the rapid moving epistemic frontier of postgenomics research and the much slower changes in the clinical and epistemic infrastructure. The dots that laboratory geneticists connect are themselves part of larger trajectories of action and may provide resistance to change. These trajectories stretch into the past with the published literature, the present with a comparison of variants, and the future with the anticipated use of the reported findings. They are institutionally regulated through laboratory validation and certification oversight, the work of competitors, and the feedback from clients. These infrastructures constrain the range of interpretations and impose evidentiary standards on the laboratory report.
Exome sequencing exposes a growing gap between Mendelian and postgenomic causality for clinical purposes, but it is unclear that the gap will lead to an epistemic revolution in clinical genetics. Kuhn emphasized the transformative role of scientific anomalies at a cognitive and epistemological level, but, if no problematized patient harm occurs in clinical settings and insurance companies pay for tests, anomalous contradictions may linger for long periods (Wynne 2005) . The collective reconciliation efforts with their institutional backing and grounding in the genetics literature resulting in actionable reports may be sufficient proof of exome sequencing's clinical utility. In spite of a growing gap between the edge of postgenomic research and the use of next-generation sequencing technologies in the clinic, the exome labo-ratory report may currently constitute the best tool available for the job of genetically diagnosing patients.
These epistemic and infrastructural challenges matter greatly because with every genetic cause laboratory geneticists report, they not only have an opportunity to reframe a patient's diagnosis at the molecular level leading to possible repercussions for relatives and reproductive decision-making if the cause was inherited, but laboratory geneticists also take a stance on what genetic causality is. As causality brokers, they are positioned to reinvigorate a genetic deterministic worldview. More striking than genetic determinism, however, is their determined effort to push interpretive flexibility and make causal connections while staying true to the available evidence in order to withstand external scrutiny. The spectrum of causality across cases is so broad, variable, and contingent on future events that "determinism" as descriptor of genetic causality with its connotation of a final or even main cause is a misnomer.
Indeed, the switch to exome sequencing demonstrates that genetic variants rarely causally fix the patient's phenotype once and for all but causality becomes part of an evolving picture. Even when the team confirms a genephenotype connection in accordance with the literature-their slam dunkthe predictive value of exome testing is limited because the patient constitutes, what Freese (2008) calls, a phenotypic bottleneck: the genes will exert their influence differently in people's embodied constitution (see also Krieger 2005) . The reported variants explain the phenotype a patient presents here and now. The temporal qualifier "now" leaves open the possibility that if the patient develops additional symptoms or reacts positively to treatments-in other words when the phenotype changes-other variants now considered irrelevant may become clinically significant. In less clearcut cases, the genetic links are prompts for additional follow-up tests, for checking updates in the genetic literature, or for monitoring the patient. Attributing genetic causality with exome sequencing becomes one waypoint in an ongoing course of clinical management. Genetic causality remains a "thing-in-motion" (Appadurai 1986 ) and the motion depends on changes in our understanding of genotypes and phenotypical developments.
Genetic causality depends on the collective process of interpreting signs during the data board meetings. The purchase of a pragmatist semiotic analysis is the ability to draw out the evolving chains of meaning making that human interpreters follow in the journey from doubt to certainty, even if the final result is acknowledging uncertainty. The interpreters have a good sense of the kind of semiotic chains of interest: they engage similar objects, signs, and broadly pregiven interpretants. They also know what they aim for-an iconic assessment of an indexical relationship. The question is whether they will be able to make the semiotic connection. The semiotic mechanisms rest on retracing signs by following signification back to the sources that initiate signification; reconfiguring semiotic chains by playing with the constitutive aspects of signification and the purpose of signification; and comparing signs against each other to make sure the interpretants are consistent with current knowledge. These repeated interpretations of similar sign-objects-interpretants cultivate precedent-setting habits of thought and action. With so many factors to consider, even those habits, however, do not become rote but require deliberation in light of an evolving situation.
Creativity resides in the structure of semiotic processes rather than in the interpreters. With the team's strong desire to make exome sequencing reveal causality, we may expect that they would become even more creative and assign causality liberally. Genomic reconciliation, however, is tempered by the object's affordances: the object requires a convincing ground for signification. In addition, creativity remains constrained by the materiality of the previously associated chains of the signs and objects and the precedentsetting rationale for deviating from usual habits. When the team deviates from their cultivated habits by reconfiguring semiotic chains-when they reverse signs, turn objects into signs, change the relationship between sign and object, take semiotic chains in unexpected directions, or construct new interpretants-more improvisational interpretations are possible. Novel associations, however, are tentative and remain highly conditional on future signification. The semiotic approach disciplines an analysis by constantly asking how the team puts the constituent parts into relationship with what kind of consequences.
At the same time, while a semiotic approach can distinguish various mechanisms of signification at work, understanding why these mechanisms are used in this situation but not in another requires an appreciation for the constraints and opportunities of the institutional setting, the purpose of signification, and problems facing interpreters. Linguistic anthropologists have noted that indexicality is multiple (Silverstein 2003) , the same sign may simultaneously point to various micro-macro levels. Consequently, they have made the case for broader cultural frames within which signs are recognized as signs and as implying certain meanings (Keane 2003; Mertz 2007) . A semiotic analysis thus eschews a narrow semiotic reductionism for an integrated view that situates meaning making within a broader institutional aim. Pragmatist semiotics contains important analytical tools to distinguish relevant contextual elements by positing interpretation as purposeful, aimed at problem solving, and by its appreciation of the institutionalization of habits of thought and action.
While this sociological application of Peircean semiotics is tailored to the interpretation of unsettled exome sequencing results, the pragmatist semiotic approach has interest for sociologists beyond those studying genomic science. The crux of the debate between social constructivists and actor-network the-ory is how one can conduct a social analysis while "granting" ontological status to nature/biology. The meaning of genes for the clinical purpose of providing a molecular diagnosis does not reside in biological materialism nor in social negotiation processes but in geneticists' semiotic deciphering of signs to answer a clinical question. While not negating the role of interests, positions in a power structure, and material resources in this negotiated decision-making process, the semiotic processes in light of cultivated habits of thought and action give social constructivists an analytical toolset for explaining how negotiations take the course they do, why they sometimes stop suddenly or seem to continue indefinitely, and the range of possible negotiated outcomes. Recentering human interpreters eases the material turn of the actor-network: it draws attention to the fact that habits of thought and action orient the signification process; it brings the difficulty of creatively turning genes into causes into sharp relief. From a semiotic perspective, to grant a privileged status to biology or, in contrast, to social negotiations is beside the point: what matters instead is how an interpreter tries to make a sign-object-interpretant stick.
